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PIKE RIVER MINE RE-ENTRY AND EMERGENCY MINE
RE-ENTRY GUIDELINES APPLICATION AND LEARNINGS
Geoffrey Nugent1, Darren Brady, David Cliff and Seamus Devlin
ABSTRACT: Prior to the Pike River Mine Disaster the Queensland Mines Rescue Service and The
NSW Mines Rescue Service undertook a project to develop a guideline and a practical prototype
software tool to demonstrate how decision makers could be better assisted during a mine emergency
which required re-entry to the mine by competent mines rescue trained personnel. The research and
development of the prototype software tool (funded through ACARP grant C19010) coincided with the
th
unfortunate events at Pike River Mine on and after the 19 November 2010.
This paper will discuss the relationship between this project‟s outcomes and the re-entry strategy and
operation at the Pike River Mine, along with learning‟s the researchers gained from this operation
undertaken by the New Zealand Mines Rescue Service and Pike River Coal Limited (in receivership).
INTORDUCTION
The aim of ACARP project C19010 Emergency response - mine entry Data Management (Nugent, et al.,
2011) has been to provide industry with a practical and cost effective example of how software based
information management systems could be developed and utilised to assist Incident Management
Teams (IMT) with effective information management and critical decision making during an emergency.
This research project was successful in developing a functioning proof of concept software tool titled
“Mine Re-entry Assessment System” (MRAS), which supported and reflected the paper based guideline
for Emergency Mine Entry or Re-entry (EMER), developed by Queensland Mines Rescue Service
(QMRS) and New South Wales Mines Rescue Services (NSWMRS). The proof of concept software
tool has been developed in Microsoft Access which is inexpensive and commonly available software to
most computer users. The need for such a tool and process has been identified and recommended in
disaster investigations, emergency exercise reports and research reports alike, highlighted by the
following examples:
 From Moura No.2: Inquiry Task Group four (Mines Rescue Strategy Development) 1994;
Knowledge of conditions in a mine following an incident is essential in planning any rescue
effort. Information systems must be provided to support implementation of the most appropriate
rescue measures;
 From Moura No.2: Inquiry Task Group four Recommendation (17) 1994; Industry should
develop an effective computer-based emergency decision support system for incident
management and training;
 From finding No.8: Upper Big Branch, Independent Report to the Governor 2011; The Upper
Big Branch disaster raised concerns about how decision-making was conducted in the
command centre and the manner in which mine rescue teams were deployed underground.
Standard protocols were not followed, effective records were not kept and rescuers‟ lives were
placed in jeopardy.
PROTOTYPE TOOL DEVELOPMENT AND FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION
Approximately 70% of required relevant information to make an informed risk based decision during an
emergency could be known before an incident occurs. Therefore the identification of, along with the
maintenance and accessibility to this relevant routine information can significantly enhance an incident
management team‟s ability to reach critical decision points in a timely manner (Nugent, et al., 2011).
Queensland Mines Rescue Service and NSW Mines Rescue Service have been working together with
other parties on a three phase project to develop new guidelines for emergency mine entry and re-entry
1
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using risk management logic based on a formal documented risk assessment (risk assessment for
emergency mine re-entry, 2009) as well as a “tool” for information management. Use of such a tool to
minimise the time to make a decision, may in many circumstances eliminate the issue of not acting
because of what is not known.
To have the critical information required to make informed decisions, the controls from the mine re-entry
risk assessment were analysed to identify who was responsible for the collection or interpretation of the
information (i.e. someone from the mine site, mines rescue or an external provider). The ability to have
and maintain this information prior to a response was also determined as was whether the information
could be generated automatically or had to be collected manually. A significant volume of information
may be required so the importance of the information required was also ranked to help those involved to
set priorities for information collection.
A task group then performed a gap analysis on what information was identified as required and what
information was available. A cross section of mining operations in Queensland and New South Wales
were selected and a total of eight mines visited by the task group to establish what information was and
wasn‟t available. The site visits identified there were some very good systems for making some of the
information available but also identified some common trends in relation to deficient emergency
response information management.
It was found that although a lot of information was captured or available it could not be provided within
an acceptable period of time. Critical information or knowledge was sometimes held by only one or two
people and thus dependent on their availability. This availability is made worse by the dependence on
persons in key roles (particularly technical, such as ventilation officers), who are responsible for many
tasks in the response with little or no backup.
It was also identified that not always do the people responsible for monitoring understand what it is they
are monitoring. There were also areas where information required was not available. This was
particularly the case for information required for validation of operational systems.
Information relating to the actual event unfolding is often missed due to inefficient and inconsistent
debriefing of key witnesses. Communication officers or control room operators through whom most
communications from underground go are often so inundated with communications that key information
is either missed or not identified as important and not passed on to decision makers.
There were many similarities between the findings of the gap analysis and reported findings from
Queensland‟s level one emergency exercises for both good and deficient practices.
The software system eventually developed was never intended to make decisions for those tasked with
making decisions during an incident, instead it is a decision support system, providing the information
required or identification of absence of information allowing the decision makers to make informed
decision. The functional specification incorporated in the checklist is developed as part of the
guidelines phase of the project as well as store information from mine site sources into a central
repository. This repository would allow mine site personnel to make an objective assessment of the
conditions for re-entry, based upon the quantity and quality of the information available.
The intent of the software development was not to create or develop a new standalone software
package unique to an emergency mine re-entry information management and decision making tool.
The researchers assessed and evaluated the capability and capacity of commonly available software
tools for their suitability and level of functionality against the objectives of the project.
The three main software tools considered for trial were Microsoft Excel, web based and Microsoft
Access. The researchers engaged three separate technical experts for each software tool to assist
with the evaluation of software suitability along with design and creation of the functional specifications
required of the software. This evaluation led to the further development of the Microsoft Access
prototype primarily due to its flexibility and reporting functionality (Brady, et al., 2012). The functional
specification requirements were determined to include:
 Identify and access or collate relevant information already existing within the mine‟s safety and
health management system;
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 Identify and access the critical information relevant to the specific incident, to avoid unnecessary
information overload;
 Provide reports that quickly summarise the information status relevant to identified hazards to
assist the decision makers determine what information is known or unknown;
 Assist decision makers to prioritise required and outstanding information to facilitate efficient
resource management;
 Maintain an up to date log of an incidents status;
 Force decision makers to formally acknowledge the adequacy of information;
 Prompt a formal process for the assessment and acknowledgement of explosibility risk;
 Provide a formal approval process for entry or re-entry into a mine during or after an incident.
It must be recognised that this, or any tool, developed to support and facilitate the process of information
management and decision making during an emergency at a mine can only be effective when:
 As a minimum its content and structure reflects the current requirements set out in the risk
based guideline the tool has been established from;
 The users of the tool have a good understanding of its functionality and purpose along with a
high understanding of risk management processes and practices.
Pike River
During this project a significant mine disaster occurred in New Zealand claiming the lives of 29 men.
th
The Pike River Mine disaster which occurred on the 19 November 2010 came only two days after the
QMRS and NSWMRS Emergency Mine Entry or Re-entry (EMER) Guideline was presented to industry
at the QMRS Inertisation Seminar in Mackay, Queensland. At this stage, although the EMER
Guideline was developed in full in a paper based format, the proof of concept software tool development
was only in its infancy.
One of the key roles carried out by the researchers at the Pike River Mine rescue and recovery
operation was advice and assistance in the strategy for and development of an effective mine re-entry
management plan. The assistance provided to Pike River mine management and NZMRS by the
researchers included:
 Risk Assessment facilitation and participation;
 Gas Analysis and interpretation;
 Hazard management plan and procedural development and review;
 Incident Management Team Participation.
NZMRS who were responsible for the establishment of the Pike River Mine Re-entry Hazard
Management Plan (HMP), after consultation with the researchers elected to base the logic and process
for the development of the re-entry plan on this project‟s research outcomes.
Whilst the Pike River mine Re-entry HMP was being developed by the NZMRS in consultation with this
project‟s researchers, the development of the MS Access MRAS software tool was also being further
progressed with both completed at the end of May 2011.
Due to the Pike River Mine Re-entry HMP being closely aligned with the strategies and processes
outlined in the EMER Guideline, the risk logic and process applied during the re-entry was also
compatible with the newly developed MRAS software. Because of this, the Mine Re-entry Control
Team (MRCT) in control of the re-entry operation agreed to utilise the MRAS software to assist the
MRCT with information management and decision making processes.
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MRAS practical application at Pike River re-entry
The primary objective of the re-entry operation was to install a fit for purpose seal within 300 m of the
main portal to provide a more effective seal preventing oxygen ingress and to augment the natural
stabilisation of the underground mine atmosphere. Additionally, the successful installation would allow
Pike River Coal Limited (in Receivership) employees to reclaim the temporary seal at the portal and
install fit for purpose double vehicle doors for potential future access.
Regardless of the distance mines rescue teams are required to travel into a mine after a significant
incident (e.g. 300 m or 3 000 m) the precautions taken and the diligence demonstrated must be no less
comprehensive in either circumstance as the consequences of potential hazards, if realised, would be
no less severe.
Based on this logic the NZMRS initiated and facilitated a comprehensive re-entry risk assessment for
the re-entry of the Pike River Mine. This risk assessment underpinned the establishment of the
NZMRS Pike River Mine re-entry HMP which also incorporated the following hazard management plans,
procedures and Trigger Action Response Plans (TARPs):
 Pike River Mine Atmospheric Monitoring HMP;
 Pike River Mine Atmospheric Monitoring TARP for Re-entry;
 Pike River Mine Atmospheric Monitoring Check Sheet;
 NZMRS Re-entry Explosibility TARP and Check List;
 NZMRS Mine authority to Enter;
 Strata Management Plan and TARPs;
 Pike River Mine Water Management Plan;
 Pike River Mine Seal design and installation SOP;
 NZMRS seal installation and operational Risk Assessment and Guidelines.
The overriding structure outlined in the NZMRS Re-entry HMP was to ensure that:
1. A MRCT was responsible for managing all activities required to control the Pike River Mine
re-entry from an operational perspective. It would manage and co-ordinate the interface
between the MRCT functional groups (Operations, Planning and Logistics) and with
stakeholders outside of the mine re-entry management structure;
2. A defined process and logic was established to ensure the gathering and assessing of relevant
information and decision making was systematic, unambiguous and well informed.
The management of the re-entry operation was conducted via the established Queensland Mines
Rescue Service Mine Emergency Management System (MEMS), Figure 1.
The established
information management and decision making process was founded on process outlined in the QMRS
and NSWMRS Emergency Mine Re-entry Guideline and is outlined in Figure 2.
Prior to the initial decision by the MRCT to re-enter Pike River mine the Pike River Information
Management check sheets (listed below) were completed and all information collated deemed adequate
by the MRCT for the assessment of known information against all applicable control procedures and
TARPs:
 Mine atmospheric monitoring check sheet;
 Mine ventilation management check sheet;
 Explosibility check sheet;
 Mine strata management check sheet;
 Mines rescue operational deployment check sheet;
 Mine re-entry critical support and resources check sheet.
354
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The objective at this stage was to evaluate and determine a number of issues:
 Where there was outstanding information, what was its significance for making an informed
decision on the risk to rescuers entering or remaining in the mine;
 Did the outstanding information impact on an authorised person‟s ability to evaluate and
conform to the requirements of the mine re-entry control procedures.

Statutory Authorities (DOL,
Police)

Pike River Reviewer
(Under Pike River Recivers

Specialists advice
(Process and
decision making)

MRCT
Mine Re-entry Controller
PRCL

Planning Manager
NZMRS

Stage 1 operation
Planning and
review

Whole of mine
monitoring simtars

Operations Manager
NZMRS

Stage 2 and 3
Planning

Operational
support (external)

Mines Rescue
Teams

Logistics Manager
PRCL

Inertisation

Internal Resources

External
Resources Liason

Figure 1 - Mine re-entry control team structure
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Figure 2 - Information management and decision making process
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This process was conducted and maintained via a paper based gap analysis process (consistent with
the EMER guideline) developed by the NZMRS and reviewed as a minimum on a daily basis or where
change occurred.
Once it was determined by the MRCT that all required information was adequate to make an informed
decision the data and information would be applied to the established control measures for the MRCT to
decide whether the risk to rescuers re-entering the mine was within acceptable limits.
The key functional elements of the MRAS software utilised by the MRCT to assist with decision making,
further information management and document control were:
 Re-entry control questions for the assessment of explosibility risk;
 Explosibility graph (MS Excel) for assessment of explosibility, trending and rate of change at
each sample point;
 Management of actions required, priority and status as set by the IMT;
 Current situation reporting and recording;
 Authority to enter document.
The assessment of explosibility risk
When the MRCT assessed the risk of explosibility to rescuers the following conditions had to be met and
acknowledged:
1. Any analysis system of a potentially explosive atmosphere must consider all flammable gases
present in the atmosphere and determine;
 The flammable gas content expressed as a percentage of the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL)
present;
 The oxygen content expressed as a percentage of the Oxygen Nose Point (ONP) present.
2. All samples, from the same location, for both LEL and ONP must be plotted and trended together
against time on the same graph. The same graph should have the capability to plot barometric
pressure trends against time.
3. When determining the explosibility risk level the following controls must be observed:
 Prior to entry the assessment of relevant knowledge for mine re-entry must be completed and all
information deemed to be adequate to determine explosibility risk level;
 Atmospheric conditions must be continuously monitored by rescuers underground and
monitored and trended on the surface by a competent person at all times while people are
underground;
 When it cannot be confirmed there are no potential ignition sources which may come into
contact with a potentially explosive or explosive environment it must be taken that an ignition
source exists;
 The level of assessment must be based on the highest level of risk within the mine not just the
area which the rescue team is going to enter;
 These control limits may only be modified when a full re-entry RA is undertaken for the specific
emergency situation. The original risk assessment must be reviewed as part of this process;
 Currency of the data must be taken into account when assessing gas results e.g. Tube bundle
lag times and the time bag samples were taken;
 Sufficient time must be allowed for rescuers to exit the mine or atmosphere before the
environment enters higher levels of risk.
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MRAS has been designed to allow decision makers to assess and address these requirements in
electronic format and produce a PDF report for acknowledgement with signature by the decision maker.
The software also allows decision makers to directly access the explosibility analyses graph designed
during this project (Figure 3).

Figure 3 - Explosibility assessment tool
In an effort to equip decision makers with tools to assist in applying these criteria a relatively simple
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was set up to trend both the LEL and ONP with the ability to add trend lines.
Figure 4 shows a plot of data collected for a sample location where it appears that the LEL will exceed
the trigger levels before the ONP drops below its trigger. By using the trending forward feature in
Microsoft Excel it is possible to predict when this would as shown in Figure 4.
Often gas results are influenced by barometric pressure so decision makers are aided if the plots include
barometric pressure trends occur as shown in Figure 4 (Brady, et al., 2012).

Figure 4 - Trend data with barometric pressure trend
16 – 17 February 2012
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The spreadsheet created features a summary page (Figure 5) that collates the data and displays latest
results, trigger levels and TARP actions for each point. Also included is the overall status and trigger
level which is the highest risk level of all points.
Last Data:

4/07/2010 11:00

Overall Status:

3

No Entry into the Mine

Point
Name:
Number:

Lag Times:

Point 1

Location 1

42 mins

4/07/2010 11:00 Yes

80.22

153.22

18.7 4.30249

0.51

Point 2

Location 2

32 mins

4/07/2010 11:00 Yes

300.81

77.84

9.5 4.30249

Point 3

Location 3

21 mins

4/07/2010 10:05 No

51.06

157.56

Point 4

Location 4

40 mins

4/07/2010 11:00 Yes

38.24

Point 5

Location 5

47 mins

4/07/2010 11:00 Yes

Point 6

Location 6

54 mins

Point 7

Location 7

Point 8
Point 9

Ignition Source Possible:%LEL:

%ONL:

CO
(ppm):

Tarp Actions

Graph:

3

No Entry into the Mine

Graph 1

0.6

3

No Entry into the Mine

Graph 2

19.28 0.00716

0.065

1

Rescuer may enter environment / Rescuers may
operate adjacent to the environment

Graph 3

160.09

19.59

0.0051

0.058

1

Rescuer may enter environment / Rescuers may
operate adjacent to the environment

Graph 4

102.80

148.30

18.12

0.1

0.75

3

No Entry into the Mine

Graph 5

4/07/2010 11:00 Yes

80.22

153.22

18.7 4.30249

0.51

3

No Entry into the Mine

Graph 6

51 mins

4/07/2010 11:00 No

81.87

160.09

0.0051

0.058

3

Rescuer must not enter the environment / Rescuers
may operate adjacent to the environment

Graph 7

Location 8

47 mins

4/07/2010 11:00 Yes

300.81

77.84

9.5 4.30249

0.6

3

No Entry into the Mine

Graph 8

Location 9

57 mins

4/07/2010 11:00 Yes

300.81

77.84

9.5 4.30249

0.6

3

No Entry into the Mine

Graph 9

49 mins

4/07/2010 10:05 Yes

51.06

157.56

19.28 0.00716

0.065

1

Rescuer may enter environment / Rescuers may
operate adjacent to the environment

Graph 10

Point 10 Location 10

Date & Time:

O2:

19.59

%CO2:

Status:

Figure 5 - Summary page
Authority to enter
Where it was deemed the risk to be acceptable for rescuers to enter the mine an “Authority to Enter” was
completed in MRAS with a PDF report produced for and signed off by the Incident controller and
NZMRS appointed person. This document formed part of the mine re-entry action plan along with other
relevant information which included:
 Up to date mine plans;
 Current status;
 Relevant and current environmental readings and trends;
 Status of mine ventilation and mine services;
 Barometric pressure and trend;
 Known and unknown additional environmental conditions such as expected visibility and
temperature, roadway conditions, water hazards and strata hazards.
The objective of an authority to enter was to ensure the instruction for mines rescue teams to enter the
mine is unmistakable, deliberate and well informed.
Additional to the core functionality of information management, a structured decision making process for
the assessment of explosibility risk and authority to enter, the MRAS software tool was also utilised for
management of the status of general actions required of each functional area and also the maintenance
of a record of the current situation throughout the operation.
The required actions put into the software appear in chronological order and allow the user to allocate
actions to the responsible functional area with a due date and time and priority. The action on
completion can be closed out with a date and time when completed along with any comments as shown
in Figure 6.
A useful reporting function on the actions screen allows for a report to be generated showing only the
incomplete actions grouped within the responsible functional area and in order of priority as shown in,
Figure 7. Additionally the current situation throughout the operation could be maintained as regularly
as required within a dedicated function within the MRAS software and the ability to generate an
accompanying report.
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Figure 6 - General actions management tool

Figure 7 - Incomplete actions report
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CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
The researchers of ACARP project C19010 believe that due to the successful application of MRAS
during the Pike River Mine re-entry operation (and Queensland level one emergency exercise) along
with the level of interest and positive feedback from industry the outcomes of this project can be
considered successful.
The standard of which the existing proof of concept model has been developed provides a solid
foundation for realistic opportunities of commercialisation and implementation into a mine safety
management system.
Although this ACARP project has come to a close the importance of the outcomes has been clearly
recognised by industry with further support and momentum beyond this project now being provided by
industry stakeholders with an aim of successful implementation.
Elements of industry have also recognised MRAS functionality, logic and processes have potential to
greatly assist with the information management and decision making process for smaller more common
incidents at a mine. E.g. Re-entry into a mine (or part of a mine) after an orderly evacuation when a
mine site TARP has been exceeded.
When an incident occurs at a mine, decision makers must demonstrate proper diligence and take
reasonable precautions. When a decision maker permits a rescuer to re-enter or remain in a mine after
an incident, that person must ensure the risk to rescuers entering the mine after an incident is within
acceptable limits and as low as reasonably achievable. The decision makers‟ authorisation to re-enter
the mine must be unmistakable, deliberate and well informed.
The researchers believe that the results of this ACARP project have significant potential to assist
decision maker‟s to discharge their obligations during an emergency by assisting them to make well
informed risk based decisions by taking reasonable precautions and demonstrating proper diligence.
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